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INTRODUCTION 
One of the fundamental aspects of the evolutionary perspective in economic theory 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982) is the concept of business firms as “organizations that know 
how to do things” (Winter, 1987). Inspired by evolutionary theory, ‘knowledge’ and 
´capabilities’ have become central elements in the advancement of a competence-based 
theory of the firm. Seen variously as an alternative or a complement to the dominating 
transaction-cost approach, this line of research is premised on the conviction that the pos-
session and accumulation of ‘knowledge’, ‘competences’ and ‘capabilities’ are funda-
mental characteristics of firms and should have significant roles in theory addressing the 
rationale for their existence, the determinants of their boundaries and their internal 
organization.   
 
In spite of its reasonably narrow aim, the knowledge-based approach to the firm is a 
rather diverse literature. There is no agreement as to precisely what range of observable 
phenomena should be included in a ‘knowledge-based theory’, nor is there agreement on 
the definition of many central concepts, such as ‘knowledge’ and ‘capabilities’. More-
over, although most studies are framed in the tradition of evolutionary economics, the 
competence-based approach does is still some distance away from providing a truly 
‘evolutionary’ theory of the firm (Niman, 2004). 
 
This paper addresses both of these shortcomings. Its primary objective is to synthesize 
parts of the inherited literature by incorporating the issues that it has addressed into a 
larger and hopefully more coherent framework. In doing so, it attempts to extend compe-
tence-based theory in a more evolutionary direction, i.e. towards a theory not only 
explaining the existence of firms and the determinants of their boundaries, but addressing 
also the changes in industry composition and structure that result from the creation, 
growth, and the replacement of old firms by new ones.  
 
In order to more clearly set out the attempted contribution and how the paper builds on 
available literature, the next section offers a brief review of a number of central models. 
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The review identifies four distinct types of knowledge governance problems, each with 
its own characteristics and strategic significance. It also reveals a certain conceptual 
ambiguity regarding the abstract notions of ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowledge transfer’ 
employed in defining these problems.  
 
The remainder of the paper sketches an evolutionary synthesis of the inherited literature 
with the aim to resolve some of its ambiguities and contradictions. It proposes a few 
building blocks of a dynamic theory of the firm, combining elements of both transaction 
cost theory and the knowledge-based view. A central component of the proposed synthe-
sis is an explicit social-constructivist and contextual conceptualization of knowledge as 
residing in groups of practitioners, epistemic communities. Section 3 defines and 
discusses the nature of different types of such communities and the structure of the 
knowledge they possess.  
 
In section 4, the proposed conceptualization is applied in a stylized evolutionary model, 
indicating the dynamic relationships between the four knowledge governance problems, 
indicating some possible consequences for the institutional structure of production in the 
industry (Coase, 1992).      
 
THE ‘KNOWLEDGE-BASED’ VIEW 
Many of the notions regarding the nature of ‘knowledge’ informing the ‘knowledge-
based’ theory of the firm can be traced to Winter’s (1987) observation that explicit 
knowledge is easier and less costly to pass on and replicate than is tacit knowledge, the 
transfer of which can only take place in face-to-face interaction in master/apprentice-like 
relationships. According to this argument, firms have an incentive to invest in articulation 
and codification of their knowledge – especially knowledge that they intend to replicate 
or frequently transfer from one context to another. However, while articulation facilitates 
voluntary transfer, it tends, Winter suggested, to also increase the risk of involuntary 
transfer, imitation.  
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The idea that voluntary replication and involuntary imitation are mirror image problems 
has found wide acceptance and has stimulated a rich stream of both theoretical and 
empirical research. As formulated by Spender and Grant (1996, p. 8), a basic proposition 
of the genre is that “...knowledge which is embodied in individual and organizational 
practices… cannot be readily articulated. Such knowledge is of critical strategic impor-
tance because, unlike explicit knowledge, it is both inimitable and appropriable.” Taking 
the argument one step further, the ‘knowledge based approach’ to the theory of the firm 
argues that the very existence of firms is due to their ability to manage knowledge, espe-
cially in its tacit forms, more cheaply and efficiently than is possible under other forms of 
governance. 
 
In reviewing this influential literature, the reader is struck by the heterogeneity both of its 
fundamental assumptions and of the conclusions reached. While there is general 
agreement that certain characteristics of firm organization, such as propinquity, stability 
of relationships and commonalities of vocabulary provide favorable conditions for 
knowledge-intensive processes, there is no agreement as to whether these complement 
more traditional transaction-cost arguments (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Nickerson and 
Zenger, 2004) or supersede them by providing an alternative and more convincing set of 
explanations to the existence and boundaries of firms (Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1993, 
1996; Madhok, 1996; Conner 1991; Conner and Prahalad, 1996).   
 
There is no agreement either as to the nature of the knowledge processes that the propo-
nents of knowledge-based theories believe are more efficiently carried out within firms 
than across markets. Some emphasize the efficiency of firms in the exploitation of exist-
ing knowledge; others view their superiority in the creation of new knowledge. In some 
accounts, firms are argued to be superior vehicles for the transfer of (tacit) knowledge 
within epistemic communities, i.e. functional or occupational groups whose members 
have the same training and professional experience; others emphasize their role in facili-
tating exchange of specialist knowledge between members of different groups, where 
lack of common expertise makes knowledge-sharing difficult. Combining these two 
dimensions yields a simple typology of basic knowledge governance problems (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. Typology of knowledge governance problems 
 
Four types of knowledge governance 
Replication  
Kogut and Zander (1993) in a celebrated article1 focus on the replication of knowledge, 
as in the case of transfer of manufacturing technology between production plants in 
different countries.2 Firms, they argue, specialize in the internal transfer of tacit and 
idiosyncratic knowledge. Their ability to internally replicate knowledge in new locations 
more cheaply than this can be accomplished through licensing or other market 
transactions accounts for the emergence of the multinational corporation. The cost of 
internal transfer relative to transfers governed by arm’s length contracts therefore 
determines the boundaries of firms. 
 
Integration  
Grant (1996a, 1996b) too focuses on knowledge application rather than knowledge 
generation. Following Demsetz (1988), Grant’s analysis is based on the observation that 
the production of goods and services requires the coordination of many individual 
specialists: 
                                                 
1 Tallman, 2003; Verbeke, 2003; Kogut and Zander, 2003. 
2 The authors elsewhere (Kogut and Zander, 1992; 1996) discuss also the creation and recombination of 
knowledge as well as its transfer between functional groups (such as from R&D to production). However, 
their discussion makes only passing reference to the qualitative differences between these processes. 
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Although knowledge can be learned more effectively in specialized fashion, its 
use to achieve high living standards requires that a specialist somehow use the 
knowledge of other specialists. This cannot be done by learning what others 
know, for that would undermine gains from specialized learning. It cannot be 
done only by purchasing information in the form of facts, for in many cases the 
theory that links facts must be mastered if facts are to be put to work. (Demsetz, 
1988, p. 157, italics in original.) 
 
But whereas Kogut and Zander (1993) underscore the ability of firms to cheaply replicate 
existing knowledge, Grant emphasizes the role of firms for the integration of specialist 
knowledge.3 In his conceptualization, firms exist as institutions because they create 
conditions, such as propinquity and ‘low-powered’ incentives that facilitate the 
integration and coordination of specialist knowledge (Grant, 1996, p. 112). 
 
Combination  
Following another lead provided by Kogut and Zander (1992), a number of authors 
(Grant, 1996b; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Galunic and Rodan, 1998; Nickerson & 
Zenger, 2004) discuss the relative advantages of firms in the generation of knowledge, 
rather than in its exploitation. In line with Schumpeter’s (1934) classical definition, these 
authors view innovation as the result of new combinations of specialized knowledge. 
Firms, they argue, are superior to markets in coordinating the activities required to create 
new configurations of knowledge in the form of ‘architectural innovations’ (Abernathy 
and Clark, 1985; Henderson and Clark, 1990), requiring integration of knowledge across 
disciplinary and functional boundaries.   
 
The conceptual underpinnings for this proposition vary. In line with Kogut and Zander 
(1992; 1996), Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) stress the ability of firms to support the crea-
tion of ‘social capital’, in which concept they include structural (e.g. access to people and 
information), cognitive (e.g. common language) and relational (e.g. trust and mutual 
                                                 
3 Referring to the problem of knowledge integration, Kogut and Zander (1992, p. 389) note that “the 
vertical transfer of technology, as when a product is moved from development to production, poses 
additional problems insofar that the shared codes of functional groups differ.” Although more difficult, the 
authors do not seem to view these problems as qualitatively different from those associated with 
replication. Firms resolve both by providing “…a set of higher-order organizing principles [which] act as 
mechanisms by which to codify technologies into a language accessible to a wider circle of individuals” 
(Kogut and Zander, 1992, p. 389).      
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obligations) dimensions. Nickerson and Zenger (2004) agree that ‘consensus-based hier-
archies’ may be superior on solving very complex problems with a high degree of inter-
action among individual design solutions. However, they add the critical observation that 
such governance is also associated with costs and drawbacks:  
The costs associated with supporting extreme levels of knowledge transfer are 
substantial and become unwarranted as problems diminish in complexity. Further, 
low-powered incentives constrain the motivation to develop specialized knowl-
edge and dampen incentives for solution search. The scope of investment in 
shared language and socialization and the efforts involved in the transfer of 
knowledge can be excessive when problems are only moderately complex… 
Moreover, social attachments and idiosyncratic language that accompany consen-
sus-based hierarchy can increase the cost of search by generating search heuristics 
that are limited in the knowledge sets that they incorporate. (Nickerson and 
Zenger, 2004, p. 627)   
 
Thus, in contrast to the many contributions which highlight the benefits of hierarchy over 
market governance, Nickerson and Zenger (2004) explicitly point out its possible limits, 
noting that a truly knowledge-based theory of the firm requires ‘a theory of alignment’, 
e.g. “a theory that predicts when hierarchies are preferred to markets or when markets 
prevail” (Nickerson and Zenger, 2004, p. 618).      
 
Articulation  
The final quadrant in Figure 1 refers to knowledge creation within occupational 
communities (Cowan et al., 2000). As argued elsewhere (Håkanson, 2003), this takes 
place primarily through articulation of the tacit knowledge informing craftsman-like 
practice into explicit codes, tools and theory. Investment in articulation is undertaken in 
search of benefits, such as those associated with innovation, division of labor, and repli-
cation and control. Articulation implies knowledge creation – it allows tasks to be 
accomplished that could not previously be accomplished or not accomplished so well. By 
definition, articulation leads to an increase in the amount of explicit knowledge available 
to the community. But since the application of new, more explicit theory, tools and codes 
creates new experiential learning opportunities, articulation increases also the tacit 
components of a community’s knowledge base (Resnick, et al., 1991; Boisot, 1995). 
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In spite of its pervasive importance, articulation and the associated governance problems 
have been largely ignored in knowledge-based theories of the firm. The reason, one 
suspects, is the current fascination with the tacit component of knowledge and the belief 
that because it is inimitable, ‘tacit knowledge’ is a critical source of sustainable 
competitive advantage (see, e.g., Winter, 1987; Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1993; Grant, 
1996b). 4 The benefits of articulation are largely ignored in the literature. 
 
Conclusions 
As outlined above, available accounts of knowledge governance focus on specific types 
of governance problems and are therefore fragmentary to the overall problem. However, 
prior studies provide the basis for the synthetic perspective sketched in this paper. As its 
basis, it adopts a slightly less abstract conceptualization of ‘knowledge’ than has been 
customary, i.e. as beliefs developed, validated and applied in epistemic communities, 
groups of people pursuing a shared enterprise or practice.       
 
EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES    
The argument outlined in the following pages is premised on the conviction that all 
knowledge is socially constructed and context dependent. The knowledge context is 
defined by the social community where it resides.5 Knowledge that is recognized as rele-
vant and useful in one context may be totally meaningless in another.  
Within communities, producing, warranting, and propagating knowledge are 
almost indivisible. Between communities, as these get teased apart, division 
becomes prominent and problematic. Hence, the knowledge produced doesn’t 
readily turn into something with exchange value or use value elsewhere. (Brown 
and Duguid 1998, p. 99) 
                                                 
4 In spite of its centrality to the theoretical arguments of ‘the knowledge-based view’, the concept of ‘tacit 
knowledge’ is rarely unambiguously defined but is often invoked as shorthand for “stickiness” (von Hippel, 
1994; Szulanski, 1996). An important exception is Nickerson and Zenger (2004) whose argument centers 
on the ‘complexity’ of the problems confronting firms and the degree of interdependence between 
specialist knowledge sets. Firms, they argue, are superior to markets in solving problems that cannot be 
decomposed into independent sub-problems, each drawing on only one set of specialized expertise. Their 
approach offers a both more rigorous and more relevant definition of knowledge ‘tacitness’ than that 
commonly employed (cf. Fleming and Sorenson, 2004).  
5 The minimum community size is two; there are forms of knowledge that only lovers share and can 
appreciate. Other kinds of knowledge seem so universal that they are probably shared by all human beings. 
Most types of knowledge relevant in managerial practice and for economic theory – the types that this 
paper attempts to address – lie between these two extremes. 
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Accepting – without going into the underlying epistemological assumptions – Plato’s 
classical definition of ‘knowledge’ as ‘justified true belief’6, I shall assume that knowl-
edge obtains economic significance through application in the performance of an eco-
nomically meaningful activity, i.e. the exercise of a skill that it informs. When engaging 
in a common enterprise, groups of people develop, maintain and nurture the knowledge 
informing the skills of their practice (Lave and Wenger 1991; Brown and Duguid 1991, 
1998, 2001a, 2001b). 
 
Through its practice, a community develops a shared understanding of what it does, the 
means and methods it employs, the standards by which its activity is judged, and how it 
relates to other communities and their practices – in all a ‘world view’ (Lave and 
Wenger, 1991). This understanding comprises the community’s collective epistemic base 
(Mokyr, 2002). The processes of developing the knowledge base and the formation of the 
community are significantly interdependent: the practice develops the understanding, 
which can reciprocally change the community’s practice and their members’ view of 
themselves (Brown and Duguid 1998, p. 96).  
 
In Wenger’s (1998) analysis of insurance claims processors or Orr’s (1996) studies of 
service technicians, small work groups or functional departments are seen as forming 
individual ‘communities of practice’ whose membership is defined by engagement in a 
common enterprise and mastery of a shared repertoire of skills (Lave and Wenger, 1991; 
Brown and Duguid, 1991, 1998; Wenger, 1998). Mutual engagement requires interaction 
and is therefore favored by geographical proximity and sometimes communities cluster in 
specific regions, where the acquisition of their skills is favored by the presence of organi-
zations providing appropriate learning and employment opportunities (Håkanson, 2005). 
Examples include the engineers developing the technologies underlying the flat panel 
display industry (Murtha et al. 2001), and the cellular telephony clusters of northern 
Jutland (Dahl et al., 2003)  
 
                                                 
6 Plato’s definition is not unproblematic (c.f. Gettier 1963) but will have to do for the present purpose. 
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However, once the skills of the community have been acquired, mutual engagement does 
not necessarily require face-to-face interaction but can – “given the right context” – take 
place over the phone, by email or over the radio (Wenger 1998, p. 74). Indeed, most pro-
fessional communities extend beyond individual organizations and localities. ‘Normative 
isomorphism’ through selection, socialization and vocational training leads to a profes-
sional… 
… pool of almost interchangeable individuals who occupy similar positions across a 
range of organizations and possess a similarity of orientation and disposition that may 
override variations in tradition and control that might otherwise shape organizational 
behavior. (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p. 152) 
 
The semantic conventions in the inherited literature are ambiguous and it is useful, as 
Brown and Duguid (2001b) suggest, to distinguish such larger communities from the 
smaller work groups for which the term ‘community of practice’ was originally coined.7 
Following recent usage (Steinmueller 2000; Cowan et al. 2000; Edwards 2001), I propose 
to use the term ‘epistemic community‘ to denote groups of people mastering the tools, 
codes and theories of a common practice regardless of their geographical location and the 
intensity of mutual contact that they may maintain. In many accounts,8 ‘epistemic 
communities’ are defined as communities of practice engaged in deliberate knowledge 
creation. For the present purpose, that distinction is not so important since to various 
                                                 
7 Dougherty, following Douglas’ (1987) retranslation of Fleck’s (1935/1979) ‘Denkkollektiv’ (‘thought-
collective’), uses the term ‘thought worlds’ to denote the beliefs and perceptions common to members of 
functional departments. Boland and Tenkasi (1995) use the phrase ‘communities of knowing’, Bechky 
(2003a; 2003b) prefers ‘occupational communities’ while Grant (1996) and Carlile (2002) discuss ‘expert 
knowledge’ primarily in terms of business functions. Quoting the works of Strauss (1978, 1982, 1984) on 
‘social worlds’, Knorr Cetina (1999) on ‘epistemic cultures’ and Ziman (1967) on ‘public knowledge’ in 
scientific communities, Brown and Duguid (2001b, p. 205) propose the term ‘networks of practice.’ The 
latter term has the advantage of emphasizing the instrumental aspects of knowledge: ‘networks of practice’, 
like ‘communities of practice’ develop over time in the common pursuit of a shared enterprise; they exist 
because they have a task to accomplish. On the other hand – as the authors note – the reference to 
‘networks’ is potentially misleading in that it implies a certain regularity of contact that need not apply. 
8 The concept was first proposed by Holzner (1968) to denote “knowledge-oriented communities in which 
cultural standards and social arrangements interpenetrate around a primary commitment to epistemic 
criteria in knowledge production and application” (Holzner and Marx 1979, p. 108). It was similarly 
applied also by Knorr Cetina (1981) and Amin and Cohendet (2004, pp. 74-78) to denote groups of people 
involved in the deliberate production of knowledge, such as scientists or R&D engineers. It is also 
employed in the field of international relations to denote communities whose members (1) share a common 
set of values and beliefs, (2) have common theoretical understanding regarding causalities regarding policy 
measures and desired outcomes, (3) have shared criteria for validity, and (4) pursue the same policy 
enterprise (Haas, 1992).        
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degrees all communities of practice engage in learning and knowledge creation – both by 
deliberate intention and by accident (Lave and Wenger, 1991).     
  
Epistemic Communities as Interpretation Systems 
Epistemic communities form ‘interpretation systems’ (Daft and Weick 1984). They exist 
in order to help their members interpret the world and provide meaning to their activities. 
Their ‘practice’ is always (negotiated) social practice and includes both explicit and tacit 
components (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Wenger 1998). Epistemic communities are where 
knowledge resides and articulation and knowledge creation can take place.  
 
Epistemic communities are defined and delineated by the generation and maintenance of 
shared coding schemes (vocabulary, codes) and cognitive frames (theories, mental maps) 
that help the community and its members define and solve problems and ‘get the job 
done’ (Håkanson, 2003). Communities are also characterized by their inherited technol-
ogy, much of which is typically embedded in physical artifacts of various kinds. 
DATA CAPABILITIESCODES
TOOLS
THEORY
 
Figure 1.  The functional elements of epistemic communities (adapted from Daft and  
Weick, 1984) 
 
The capabilities of a community, i.e. the range and efficiency of the tasks it can perform, 
are determined by the dynamic interaction of these three elements, here labeled codes, 
theory, and tools (Figure 1). I use the concepts broadly. Thus ‘codes’ refer to all symbolic 
means, through which the community communicates with its environment and its mem-
bers with one another, including both ordinary language and more specialized varieties, 
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such as mathematics, chemical formulae or computer code – and pictorial representa-
tions (graphs, maps, diagrams and pictures, etc.).9 ‘Theory’ refers to the cognitive frames 
that help it interpret and make sense of the messages.10 It includes tacit cultural elements 
and ‘mental maps’ but also formal theoretical models of the causalities deemed relevant 
to the practice. ‘Tools’, finally, is used to denote the physical artifacts that the commu-
nity employs in the execution of its tasks or the development of its knowledge, including 
its physical “memory”, i.e. the records and artifacts in which its experience has been 
codified or embodied and on which it can draw in performing its tasks.                          
 
Some codes, some theories and the use of some tools are generally learnt as part of a 
typical primary school curriculum, for example the rules and conventions of writing the 
local language and the skills of using a pencil. The mastery of others is specific to par-
ticular epistemic communities and is acquired through a combination of advanced general 
education, specialized training programs, apprenticeship or trial-and-error experiential 
learning in actual practice. They include both tacit elements and explicit cognitive sche-
mata, ranging from simple rules of thumb to explicit scientific theory. 
 
Epistemic communities and knowledge governance 
In the present context, epistemic communities are significant because membership affects 
both the ability and the incentives to exchange knowledge. Indeed, community 
membership is (by definition) a precondition for knowledge exchange. Mastery of the 
explicit codes, theory and tools of a community enables the members of a community to 
                                                 
9 One of the things required of new members of a community is the mastery of the local language: 
“[K]nowing how to act within a domain of action is learning how to make competent use of the categories 
and the distinctions constituting that domain… [To] engage in collective work is to engage in a discursive 
practice, namely in the normative use of a sign system which is directed at influencing aspects of the world 
and whose key categories and distinctions are defined through their use in discourse” (Tsoukas and 
Vladimirou 2001, p. 978). However, as White (1990) has pointed out, effective use of language also 
requires (generally tacit) agreement as to what level of imprecision is acceptable: “Part of maintaining a 
community is maintaining the agreement not to speak or ask about the ways in which its language means 
differently to for different members. And those differences can be so enormous that in listening to the talk 
one is often surprised that it can go on at all.” (White 1990, p. 36 in Weick 1995, p. 107) 
10 Cognition is the most socially-conditioned activity of man, and knowledge is the paramount social 
creation. The very structure of language presents a compelling philosophy characteristic of that community, 
and even a single word can represent a complex theory…. every epistemological theory is trivial that does 
not take the sociological dependence of all cognition into account in a fundamental and detailed manner.” 
(Fleck 1935, p. 42 in Douglas 1987, p. 12) 
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transmit and receive codified knowledge as ‘information’. Moreover, exposure to the 
same type of experiential learning processes ensures that much of the tacit knowledge of 
the community is also held in common (Boisot, 1995; Sanchez, 1997). This is important 
because it facilitates the transfer also of incompletely codified knowledge, such as that 
embodied in physical artifacts. Thus, both through voluntary sharing and through 
involuntary imitation, community membership provides potential access to all knowledge 
available to the community.11  
 
Second, epistemic communities provide identity to their members, thereby influencing 
their readiness and motivation to share knowledge (Lave and Wenger, 1991; Brown and 
Duguid, 1991; Fiol, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 1996; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998; 
Wenger, 1998; Osterloh and Frey, 2000). As emphasized by Lave and Wenger (1991, p. 
53) “… identity, knowing, and social membership entail one another.” The assumption 
that knowledge is socially constructed implies that ‘learning’ takes place not only in the 
mind of the learner. It is also a social process of becoming an ‘insider’: 
Learners do not receive or even construct abstract, “objective,” individual knowl-
edge; rather, they learn to function in a community. They acquire that particular 
community’s subjective viewpoint and learn to speak its language. Learners are 
acquiring not explicit, formal “expert knowledge,” but the embodied ability to 
behave as community members. (Brown and Duguid, 1991, p. 48)  
 
Of course, identities are never singular. Individuals belong to and identify with multiple 
epistemic communities, both occupational and private ones. Occupational identities 
themselves are often complex. Individuals tend to identify both with their professions and 
with the firms where they are employed, but occupational identities may also be linked to 
work groups, functional departments or geographical sites (Fiol, 1991; Kogut and Zander, 
1996).  
 
For both cognitive and motivational reasons, knowledge exchange within professional 
epistemic communities is generally unproblematic; it can be accomplished with ease 
regardless of geographical distance or organizational memberships. Members have simi-
                                                 
11 This helps to explain Zander’s and Kogut’s (1995) unexpected finding that the hazard of imitation of 
manufacturing technologies was unrelated to their degree of tacitness.  
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lar backgrounds in terms of interests, formal training and practical experience. They 
interpret their common practice in similar ways and share mastery of its tools. As already 
noted, these commonalities are not limited to explicit aspects; engagement in the same 
practice provides similar types of experiential or tacit knowledge. In consequence, 
knowledge exchanges associated with replication and articulation do not typically require 
hierarchical governance; they can efficiently be accomplished both through market 
transactions and in informal network bartering (von Hippel, 1987; Schrader, 1991). 
 
More difficult, and of more immediate theoretical significance are the governance prob-
lems associated with the exchange of knowledge across professional epistemic commu-
nities; as convincingly argued in the contributions already referred to (Grant, 1996a, 
1996b: Napiet and Ghoshal, 1998; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004), integration and combi-
nation of knowledge often require or favor hierarchical governance. The reason, I shall 
argue, is that firms constitute special forms of epistemic communities, the creation of 
which requires transaction specific investments unlikely to be realized under market gov-
ernance. 
 
Firms as Epistemic Communities  
As emphasized by Grant (1966a), a primary reason for the existence of firms is that they 
provide the means for knowledge integration and coordinated action without requiring 
people of different occupational backgrounds to share or understand each other’s knowl-
edge and world-views. In other words, the significance of firms for knowledge 
governance is their ability to form epistemic communities in their own right, spanning 
heterogeneous occupational and functional groups. Like other epistemic communities, 
those formed by firms and other organizations are defined by the uniqueness of the codes, 
theories and tools that their members share: common vocabulary, organizational culture 
and boundary objects (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Firms as epistemic communities 
  
 
 
Common vocabulary  
One of the elements most often discussed in the literature is the ability of firms to provide 
their members with a common language or code (Arrow, 1974). As Grant, (1996a, p. 
115) points out, this may include also the ‘common knowledge,’ of natural language and 
other basic symbolic means of expression (literacy, numeracy, familiarity with standard 
software, etc). Sometimes, local terminologies are canonically prescribed in company 
manuals, but oftentimes spontaneously developed local jargon is equally important in 
facilitating communication among community members (Allen, 1977). Once acquired, 
local codes tend to be taken for granted and their mastery is largely tacit. While local 
codes enhance intra-organizational knowledge exchange, their tacit, ‘taken-for-granted’ 
character is sometimes problematic. Idiosyncratic codes create problems of 
communication across organizational boundaries,12 but may, of course, be a means to 
appropriate private knowledge rents (Kogut and Zander, 1992). 
 
 
                                                 
12 Polanyi, too, emphasizes the dependence of codes on cultural tradition:  “In learning to speak, every child 
accepts a culture constructed on the traditional interpretation of the universe, rooted in the idiom of the 
group to which it was born...“ He also notes how this impedes communication across epistemic 
communities. “Different vocabularies for the interpretation of things divide men into groups which cannot 
understand each other’s way of seeing things and acting upon them. For different idioms determine 
different patterns of possible emotions and actions.” (Polanyi 1962, p. 112) 
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Organizational culture  
The term’ organizational culture’ is here used as a shorthand to indicate both articulated 
and not so well articulated theories, beliefs and cognitive maps that guide organizational 
decision-making by providing the shared knowledge infrastructure necessary for efficient 
knowledge integration (Grant, 1966a, p. 115 f.). In Schein’s (1985, p. 7) classical 
definition, these “… assumptions and beliefs are learned responses to a group’s problems 
of survival and to problems of internal integration. They come to be taken for granted 
because they solve those problems repeatedly and reliably.” Whether tacit or explicit, the 
mental maps of organizational culture provide guidelines regarding relevant cause-effect 
relationships and facilitate discourse among people of otherwise different cognitive 
backgrounds. 
 
Boundary objects  
Like other epistemic communities, firms and other organizations are supported not only 
by intangible codes and cognitive schemata but also by tangible physical artifacts that 
bridge the epistemic boundaries of specialized occupational and functional groups 
(Carlile, 2002; Bechky, 2003; Star, 1989; 1993). Such boundary objects “…both inhabit 
several communities of practice and satisfy the informational requirements of each of 
them. In working practice, they are objects that are able both to across borders and 
maintain some sort of constant identity” (Bowker and Star 1999, p. 16). Boundary objects 
facilitate coordinated action without requiring members of different communities to align 
their understanding of each other’s knowledge:  
Perspective-taking is never a one-to-one mapping of meanings. Members of the 
same community of knowing will not have full consensus, and members of differ-
ent communities cannot simply adopt the meaning of another. … [B]oundary 
objects do not convey unambiguous meaning, but have instead a sort of symbolic 
adequacy that enables conversation without enforcing commonly shared mean-
ings. (Boland and Tenkasi, 1995, p. 362)  
 
Modern computer and information systems are pervasive examples of dedicated 
boundary objects, but many other physical manifestations of knowledge, such as 
drawings, prototypes and physical products can serve the same purpose (Bechky, 2003a; 
Carlile, 2002). 
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Implications  
The formation of firms as epistemic communities does not come about automatically but 
requires investment and effort both of the firms’ owners and managers and of their 
employees. Some of these investments have value also in alternative usage. The computer 
hardware of a management information system can be sold and used in another company 
and many of the skills employees acquire in their jobs can be exploited in other firms. 
However, many of the physical and intangible assets needed to establish the firm as an 
epistemic community are situational and cannot readily be transferred to applications 
outside the organizational context where they were created. Such transaction specific 
investments are difficult to realize under market forms of governance.   
 
Arrow (1974, p. 56), discussing the role of firm specific codes, notes that “learning the 
information channels within a firm and the codes for transmitting information through 
them is… a skill of value only internally”. Therefore,  
…the learning of a code by an individual is an act of irreversible investment for 
him. It is therefore also an irreversible capital accumulation for the organization. 
It follows that organizations, once created, have distinct identities, because the 
costs of changing the code are those of unanticipated obsolescence… (Arrow, 
1974, p. 55) 
 
Conversely, and this is, in fact, often the very reason they are undertaken – such invest-
ments can provide unique and difficult-to-imitate capabilities. For firms, as Grant per-
ceptively argues,   
… the critical source of competitive advantage is knowledge integration rather 
than knowledge itself. Specialized knowledge cannot, on its own, provide a basis 
for sustainable competitive advantage, first, because the specialized knowledge 
resides in individuals, and individuals are transferable between firms; second, 
because the rents generated by specialized knowledge is more likely to appropri-
ated by individuals than by the firm. (Grant, 1966b, p. 380) 
 
For employees, of course, mastery of the codes, theory and tools of a firm-specific epis-
temic community adds to their value and negotiating strength vis-à-vis that particular 
employer. Firms, in turn, have an incentive to let their employees appropriate some of 
that value since it creates barriers to their mobility, thereby reducing the threat of imita-
tion (Williamson, 1985; Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988; Peteraf, 1993).   
 16
TOWRDS A DYNAMIC MODEL OF KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE    
The kernel of the knowledge-based critique of transaction-based theory is the simple but 
fundamental observation that in order for transaction-cost logic to apply, there must be 
something to transact. Incentives to behave opportunistically (or cooperatively) are only 
relevant to the extent that such behavior is matched by the requisite ability. Without 
access to some valuable asset to cheat about, the readiness or desire to do so is little but a 
character flaw and lacks economic significance. The fundamental question that the theory 
of the firm needs to address, therefore, is the relative role of incentives and transaction 
costs, on the one hand, and capabilities and production costs, on the other, in explaining 
the choice of governance. As outlined above, the literature suggests that these roles vary 
in predictable ways between the four archetypes of knowledge governance problems.  
 
Although some of the detail remains to be worked out, the extant literature provides a 
good understanding of each type of knowledge governance situation. However, little 
attention has been given to the interrelationships between different kinds of knowledge 
governance problems and to their relative significance. The conceptualization outlined 
below attempts to address these issues. While accepting that each of the four types of 
knowledge governance can be analyzed in isolation from the others, it advances the 
proposition that there are also important linkages between them. As schematically 
depicted in Figure 3, these linkages introduce a dynamic aspect and suggest the 
possibility of a more evolutionary conceptualization of the knowledge-based view. 
Combination Integration Articulation Replication
New knowledge
 
Figure 3.  A dynamic model of knowledge governance 
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Combination  
In line with evolutionary theory in the Schumpeterian tradition, entrepreneurial new 
business formation is associated with innovations, i.e. new combinations of existing 
knowledge and physical assets. In assembling such combinations, the entrepreneur must 
decide on the contractual forms by which each will be obtained (Alvarez and Barney, 
2004). Inherited transaction cost logic suggests that knowledge assets that are well 
defined, either because they are highly codified or because they are embedded in physical 
artifacts, will typically be managed through non-hierarchical governance. More intriguing 
are the contractual problems associated with the acquisition of specialized expertise, the 
precise value and use of which can typically not be ascertained in advance because 
innovation processes are often characterized by uncertain and dynamic interdependencies 
between specialist knowledge sets. As Nickerson and Zenger (2004) argue, these 
situations involve several kinds of contractual hazards that favor hierarchical governance 
solutions. Moreover, hierarchical governance also helps avoiding the ‘mundane 
transaction costs’ of creating and maintaining transactional interfaces in the fluid and 
fluctuating conditions that characterize many innovation processes (Baldwin and Clark, 
2003)13.  
 
 
                                                 
13 Although rarely made explicit, a fundamental issue underlying the literature is the definition of what 
kind of knowledge transfers constitutes ‘transactions’. According to Williamson’s (1985, p. 1) highly 
abstract notion, “a transaction occurs when a good or service is transferred across a technologically 
separable interface. One stage of activity terminates and another begins.” Although not usually formulated 
in this way, a crucial problem in the knowledge-based approach is the definition of what constitutes a 
‘technologically separate interface’, a problem about which Williamson’s discussion provides little 
guidance. In their search for a more rigorous definition, Baldwin and Clark (2003) point out that in order 
for a transfer (of knowledge, for example) to qualify as a ‘transaction’, three conditions must be met: (1) 
The transacting parties must record the fact that a transfer has occurred, (2) they have to agree on what has 
been transferred, and (3) some sort of exchange (in money or in kind) must be involved. Within firms – and 
this is an important reason for why they exist – most knowledge transfers take place without being counted, 
standardized, or paid for. The reason, Baldwin and Clark note, is that the creation of transactional interfaces 
is often costly. The relevant costs are typically not those associated with agency or opportunism, but the 
‘mundane’ costs of “...defining what is to be transferred, of counting the transfers, and of valuing and 
paying for the individual transfers. These costs… are determined by the material, energy, and information 
flows embedded in the underlying system of production. At some points in the system, transfers are simple, 
and therefore, easy to standardize, easy to count and easy to value. Mundane transaction costs are low at 
these points. At other places, transfers are complex, hence impossible to standardize, impossible to count, 
and impossible to value” (Baldwin and Clark, 2003, p. 4). 
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Integration  
In all but the most trivial cases, the commercial exploitation of a new product or service 
requires the coordinated effort of individual specialists with different kinds of functional 
and occupational expertise (Demsetz, 1988; Grant, 1996a, 1996b). In the words of 
Boland and Tenkasi (1995, p. 356), integration of knowledge across epistemic 
communities involves ‘perspective taking’, a process “in which the perspective of another 
[community] can be taken into account as part of a community’s way of knowing”. As 
argued above, a common way to achieve effective ‘perspective taking’ is the formation of 
boundary-spanning epistemic communities, such as firms and other organizations, where 
common cognitive maps, common vocabulary and various kinds of boundary objects can 
be developed. 
 
The creation and maintenance of organizational epistemic communities require 
transaction specific investments, which are likely to increase with the range and diversity 
of the knowledge they help to integrate. Firms therefore have an incentive outsource 
products and services whose use does not require in-depth knowledge of their production. 
For reasons outlined below, the proportion of knowledge that can be obtained in 
embedded form tends to increase over time. This helps to explain the observed tendency 
towards disintegration that can be observed in many mature industries (Langlois, 2003).  
 
Articulation  
The ability to integrate the knowledge residing in a firm’s various functional and 
occupational epistemic communities is often both idiosyncratic to organizational context 
and at least partially tacit. Superior integrative skills are therefore difficult to imitate and 
may confer competitive advantage (Grant 1996a). However, precisely these 
characteristics also mean that organizational processes that depend on the efficient 
exchange of knowledge between epistemic communities are often unreliable and prone to 
failure (Dougherty, 1992). Firms therefore have an incentive to improve the precision and 
reliability with which critical production processes and organizational routines can be 
performed. The quest for such control is an important motive for firms to invest in the 
articulation – the conversion of tacit into explicit knowledge – and codification – the 
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rendering of explicit knowledge in standardized fixed form (Beniger, 1986; Yates, 1989; 
Håkanson, 2003). Articulation and codification are often undertaken as a means to 
improve control and replicability, but have other fundamental consequences as well. Two 
of these are of particular significance in the present context: knowledge creation and 
increasing division of cognitive labor through task modularization.  
 
Knowledge creation 
Articulation takes place within epistemic communities and involves – in varying 
proportions – the development of new theory, new codes and new tools. As indicated in 
Figure 3, this new knowledge (theory, codes and tools) may subsequently – in new or in 
existing firms – be innovatively combined and recombined with other elements, starting 
the cycle anew.  
 
Modularization 
Explication of tacit knowledge requires the existence or creation of a suitable code. Much 
knowledge can be articulated in ordinary language, provided that a suitable vocabulary 
exists. But oftentimes more dedicated codes are needed, such as blueprints and other 
pictorial representations, flow charts or computer programs. At its most basic level, 
therefore, articulation involves classification, standardization and naming (Bowker and 
Star, 1999) as well as the creation and definition of interfaces between activities of the 
practice. It therefore facilitates the division of labor and the exploitation of benefits of 
specialization (Håkanson, 2003).  
 
Through the standardization of interfaces and transfers, articulation dramatically reduces 
the ‘mundane transaction costs’ associated with  “standardizing, counting and 
compensating”. As Baldwin and Clark (2003) perceptively note, this has several primary 
benefits: From an economic point of view, transforming non-transactional transfers of 
knowledge into transactions is a means to improve incentives and to avoid problems of 
opportunism. From an engineering point of view, it creates new possibilities to manage 
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and maintain complex production systems involving extensive division of cognitive 
labor: 
Standardizing interfaces and counting what flows across an interface are classic 
ways of managing complexity and coordinating large decentralized systems. And 
local compensatory “payments” or feedback are a brilliant device for maintaining 
resource balance (homeostasis) in a complex system; for providing prompt 
diagnosis, repair and triage; and for constructing a fault-tolerant, robust and 
incrementally extensible network. (Baldwin and Clark, 2003, p. 15)  
 
The creation of transactional interfaces is a consequence of design decisions. These, in 
turn, depend to a significant degree on the degree of articulation and codification of the 
knowledge on which they are based. Improved theoretical understanding of the 
technologies supporting a system of production increases the number of potential 
transactional interfaces within it. This makes the specialization of cognitive work more 
feasible and increases the likelihood of the system’s institutional disintegration (Garud 
and Kumaraswamy, 1995; Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996; Langlois, 2003). The model 
therefore holds promise to link micro-level knowledge governance processes to the 
evolution of industry composition and structure that result from the creation, growth, and 
the replacement of old firms by new ones. 
 
Replication  
In a world of Schumpeterian competition, the ability to replicate unique capabilities 
before obsolescence and imitation erode their value is a key strategic capability. 
Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence lend good support to the proposition that – 
all things equal – the cost and difficulty of capability replication decrease with the degree 
of articulation and codification of the underlying knowledge. Technology transfers that 
can be effected through the mere transmission of an artifact or a set of blueprints are 
clearly much less expensive than ones requiring the personal engagement of experts for 
design modifications or on-the-job training. The attractiveness of investing in 
codification, standardization and modularization increases with the frequency of transfer: 
the sooner and the more often a firm attempts to transfer its technology to a new site, the 
stronger its inducements to incur the costs and effort of its articulation (Zander and 
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Kogut, 1995; Simonin 1999) 14. The desire for increased profits through rapid and reliable 
replication is the motive-force for articulation, codification and the creation of new 
capabilities through the development of new codes, new tools and new theory (Winter 
and Szulanski, 2001; Teece, 1977; Contractor, 1981). 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION    
For both economists and management scholars, ‘knowledge’ has been a notoriously 
difficult concept to define and operationalize (Machlup, 1980). The problem is 
aggravated by the fact that, in everyday usage, the word ‘knowledge’ takes on a whole set 
of different meanings and that in the English language, ‘knowledge’ denotes both the 
‘substantial knowledge’ of facts and relationships and the ‘procedural knowledge’ of 
skills and capabilities. Perhaps in response to these difficulties, much recent theorizing 
has tended to adopt highly abstract notions of knowledge, blurring the difference between 
‘cognitive knowledge’ and ‘capabilities’, concentrating instead on the (often ill-defined) 
distinction between its ‘tacit’ and ‘explicit’ characteristics. Employing a social-
constructivist view of knowledge – defining ‘knowledge’ in terms the specific codes, 
tools and theory that individual epistemic communities recognize as conducive to their 
practice – this paper attempts to strike a middle ground in terms of abstraction, while 
upholding the distinction between procedural ‘skills’ and the cognitive ‘knowledge’ 
which informs them. 
 
                                                 
14 According to Kogut and Zander (1993), there is a causal relationship between a technology’s degree of 
codification and the probability that its transfer to foreign countries will take place through licensing rather 
than foreign direct investment. In their empirical test of this proposition, the characteristics of technologies 
as measured in 1989 are used to explain decisions regarding the mode of their foreign exploitation that 
were made, in some cases, two or three decades ea rlier. However, the implicit assumption that the tacitness 
of technologies remains constant over time is unconvincing. The statistical association observed can be 
better explained by traditional transaction-cost logic, which suggests a reverse order of causality: The 
completion of agreements involving the sale of tacit or incompletely codified knowledge is difficult. The 
wish (regardless of reason) to complete a licensing agreement therefore provides a powerful incentive to 
invest in the articulation and codification of the technologies involved. Technologies licensed to third 
parties can therefore be expected to be, on average, more completely codified than those exploited only 
internally. Analogously, the statistical relationship between the ‘codifiability’ and ‘teachability’ of 
manufacturing capabilities and the probability of early (voluntary) transfer reported in Zander and Kogut 
(1995) cannot be taken as evidence of causality unless, again, one assumes that the degree of tacitness of 
technologies is constant over time. A more probable interpretation is that rapidly transferred technologies 
are more completely articulated because firms have had more time and stronger incentives to invest in their 
codification.  
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The proposed conceptualization offers a means to reconcile and synthesize the literature 
on knowledge governance. It also suggests a number of simple, but orderly and logical 
linkages between the four basic knowledge processes of combination, integration, 
articulation and replication. The paper combines the four into a dynamic model of firm 
and industry evolution, relating the knowledge processes of firms to the division and 
specialization of cognitive work and to the nature of the transactions that link individual 
epistemic communities. It attempts to reconcile and synthesize a number of theoretical 
traditions in the literature. In so doing, it throws new and important light on the dynamic 
relationships between firm level knowledge governance and industry organization. 
Moreover, the model appears to lend itself quite naturally to the derivation of testable 
propositions that can be subjected to empirical verification. Much work remains to be 
done.    
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